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Prefatory Note

In submitting his study to the SAHS Review for possible publication the author
H. Dwight Page commented:
Given the numerous misconceptions concerning the Burgundian Wars and
especially the character of Charles the Bold, and given the extremely
important nature of these events in the evolution of the Swiss
Confederation . . . I was striving to create a most accurate and truthful
account.
As in his essay "The Crisis of Switzerland on the Threshold of the European
Union," Dr. Page takes also in this study an independent and analytically astute
approach. Perhaps his view of Charles the Bold and of his Swiss opponents is partisan
and might be challenged, yet the author's sense of history is keen and his craftsmanship
impressive.
It is 520 years since the Battle of Grandson and Murten. The events featured by
Dr. Page show with chilling force the interplay between the strengths of competing
personalities, the cogency of circumstances, and the vagaries of fate; shaping in their
intertwinedness a future neither foreseeable nor fully random.

The terror of war,

furthermore, seems to have reigned in the fifteenth century as it still has in the waning
twentieth. Will it go on ·as well in the twenty-first?
For years Dr. Arnold H. Price, the former SAHS Secretary, has studied the
possible existence of Germanic Warrior Clubs. His book is reviewed by Dr. H. Dwight
Page who incisively delineates Dr. Price's arguments and their importance for our

understanding of events long past, but still influencing the present.
This issue concludes volume XXXII of the SAHS Review. Number one offered
a glimpse of the genealogy of tl}e Kieburtz family, number two featured an account of

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive,

3

Swiss American Historical Society Review, Vol. 32 [], No. 3, Art. 1

3
the return visit of Ernest A. Thurkauf to the regions where he spent his youth, this issue
talces us back some five centuries when the Swiss Confederation was still in its formative
stage. Genealogy, the immigrant experience, and Swiss or Swiss-American history, these
are some of the dimensions the SAHS Review hopes to explore. To all the contributors
sincere thanks as well as to all the SAHS members for malcing it all possible, and to
Natalie Hector whose expertise and help in producing the SAHS Review have remained
crucial.

Leo Schelbert, Editor

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol32/iss3/1
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I.

>' ,
SWITZERLAND AND BURGUNDY IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES 1

H. Dwight Page

In the late Middle Ages Switzerland's principal rival was the Duchy of Burgundy.
Although the medieval Kingdom of Burgundy has long since vanished, in the fifteenth
century Burgundy was one of the most powerful states of Europe.2

Its territories

included present day Belgium, Holland, the French provinces of Flanders, Alsace,
Lorraine, Franche-Comt~, Savoy and Burgundy, as well as the three Swiss cantons of
Geneva, the Vaud and the Valais. For nearly two millennia, these territories of the old
Kingdom of Burgundy have been among the most progressive in Europe.

The "loi

gombette" of the ancient Burgundians was the most humane of the barbarian legal
systems used in Europe after the fall of the Roman Empire (Calmette 2). The region of
Burgundy was profoundly urbanized and Christianized during the Roman era. The two
urban centers of Roman civilization in Gaul, Autun and Lyon, were both located within
the territory of Burgundy. In the tenth century the monastic movement of Cluny, a
village in southern Burgundy, ignited a series of monastic and religious reforms
throughout Europe. In fact, since the time of the Romans the region of Burgundy has
been the most populous, the most urbanized, the best fortified, the most legally,
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intellectually and commercially advanced in Europe (Boehm 26). In this respect, it is
important to bear in mind that the present capital of the European Union, Strasbourg, was
also once within the orbit of Burgundy's influence.
Until the time of Charles the Bold (1467-1477), the last of the Valois Dukes of
Burgundy, and its assimilation into the Kingdom of France, Burgundy constituted an
autonomous state in the regions of the Rhine and Rhone valleys. The line of Burgundian
rulers, from King Gundobad in the sixth century until Charles the Bold in the fifteenth,
was unbroken. There still exists today a definite Burgundian national spirit, even though
the cities and villages of old Burgundy are now officially a part of France, Belgium,
Holland and Switzerland. School children in these regions are still taught to respect the
former rulers of Burgundy, especially Philip the Bold (1364-1404), Philip the Good
(1419-1467) and Charles the Bold (1467-1477). The people of the former Burgundy are
also united by a rich tradition of legends and folklore.

Mention of three of these

Burgundian legends will suffice to give the reader an idea of the sources of Burgundy's
national pride. There is, for example, the legend of Charles the Good, who resurrected
Robert, brother of the wicked Count Landolph, in order to persuade Landolph to grant
· him lands Robert had given to Charles. Upon seeing his resurrected brother, Count
Landolph immediately reformed his ways and granted Charles the requested deed. It is
said that whenever an injustice is about to be committed in Burgundy, Charles rises anew
from his grave and calls up the ghost of Robert to accompany him on a mission of
warning (Casey 41-45). Then there is the well documented story of Philippe Pot of the
castle of Rochepot, a fourteenth century Burgundian knight who went on Crusade and
was captured by the Saracens in Turkey. Placed in the arena in Constantinople with a
wild lion, Philippe killed the beast with a short sword to the amazement of his captors,
who liberated him as a token of respect for his Christian God. Philippe Pot is recognized
today as the national hero of Burgundy, and his combat with the lion is illustrated in a
magnificent painting in the cathedral of Dijon (Casey 107-116). Thirdly, there is the
almost Biblical legend of John of Stratlingen and the French giant, which took place near
Besanc;on during the struggle between Philip the Good and Louis XI.

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol32/iss3/1
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sleeping beneath a shade tree between the Burgundian and the French armies, the French
giant approached, eager to humiliate him before the eyes of his Burgundian compatriots.
At that point observers saw a phantom John of Stratlingen arise from the sleeping body,
stride forth accompanied by the Archangel Michael, and mysteriously behead the steelclad French Goliath (Casey 333-36). Burgundians of the time considered this miracle as
a sign of their nation's divine mission to civilize Europe.
The widespread sentiment of national pride among the people of the former
Burgundy is especially justified by the accomplishments of the Valois Dukes and
government of Burgundy in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Just as the French
consider the age of the Sun King Louis XIV as the apogee of their civilization, so do the
Burgundians regard the Valois period as the zenith of their culture. These four Valois
Dukes increased Burgundy's influence over Europe through a system of marriage
alliances with neighboring states, through the acquisition of territories and through the
maintenance of good diplomatic relations with other European rulers.

·,

Matrimony,

wealth, the arts, political intrigue and war were all harnessed to the chariot of
Burgundy's dynastic ambitions (fyler 148). However, what especially distinguished the
late medieval Dukes of Burgundy from their predecessors was their alliance with
Flanders, the richest and greatest duchy of Christendom (Cartellieri 1). On June 19 1369
Philip the Bold wed Margaret, daughter of the Count of Flanders, and thereby assured
his succession to the five Flemish counties of which she was heiress. This Flemish
alliance quickly strengthened the financial foundation of the Burgundian state. At that
time Bruges had developed into a great world market: forty-four nations traded with
Bruges in the fourteenth century. By the construction of the formidable castle of Sluis
at the mouth of the Zwin River, up which flowed to Bruges a considerable portion of the
world's commerce, Philip the Bold was able to control significantly international trade
and to inc_rease substantially the revenues of Burgundy's treasury, which profited from
the import and export duties on the Bruges trade.

Between 1385 and 1387 Philip

reorganized and centralized radically the administration of Burgundy, creating one of
Europe's most efficient political structures upon which his successors could build. As
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a result of these reforms, Burgundy was governed essentially by the Council of Dijon and
the Council of Flanders at Lille. Between 1392 and 1404 Burgundy's power and prestige
were considerably enhanced by the elevation of Philip the Bold to the position of Regent
of France, owing to the madness of his brother Charles VI, the rightful King. Philip
acquired enormous wealth during his regency of France, and this newfound wealth
contributed to the strong financial foundation of the Burgundian state. In 1396 Burgundy
acted for the first time as a major European power during the crusade to Nicopolis in

Asia Minor against the Saracens.

Owing to the aforementioned factors, Burgundy

became extremely prosperous. By the middle of the fifteenth century, ducal revenues
were running close to one million ducats annually, a sum equal to the revenues of the
Venetian Republic and twice that of the Vatican (Tyler x).

Burgundy had become

Europe's richest treasury, as evidenced by the numerous French, German and Italian
princes who borrowed regularly from Burgundian sources.
In the intellectual and artistic spheres, the Burgundian court accomplished in
northern Europe what the Italian Renaissance was achieving at the same time south of the
Alps. The library of the first Valois Duke of Burgundy, Philip the Bold, was recognized
as one of the best in Europe. Philip the Bold was indeed a true patron of literature. He
inspired the first French translation of the Bible, and he commissioned the famed
Limburg brothers to create the most splendid Bible ever seen in Europe (Cartellieri 165).
Booksellers across Europe came to look upon the Dukes of Burgundy as their personal
patrons, with the result that the duchy soon was regarded as the intellectual center of
Europe. With the reign of Philip the Good, the golden age of Burgundian literature

dawned. This duke commissioned hundreds of French, German and Italian translations
of the ancient classics. In addition, the first encyclopedias, written in modern languages,
began to appear at the Burgundian court at this time. The accessibility of so many texts
representing so many fields of learning, written in the vernacular rather than Latin,
enabled the courtiers of Burgundy to become the best read group of people on earth.
This bibliophilic culture was consummated during the reign of Charles the Bold. His
English wife, Margaret of York, was a renowned bibliOphile who extensively promoted
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literary efforts at court. The books housed in Burgundy's library at Dijon were literally
works of art.

They are highly polished examples of the technique of manuscript

illumination, and their bindings are products of equally exquisite craftsmanship. It is
important to note that in the artistic realm, the Valois Dukes of Burgundy played a role
similar to that of their contemporary Lorenzo ii Magnifico in Florence. Like Lorenzo,

.,

they inspired and patronized a large group of painters and sculptors. Some of the most
brilliant masterpieces in the repertoire of European painting date from this period. For
example, Jan van Eyck's "Madonna of the Chancellor Rolin" and his "Giovanni Arnolfini
and his Wife" were both completed while van Eyck was in the employ of Philip the Good
as his personal "peintre de chambre." Van Eyck received the grant of a yearly salary for
life from Duke Philip, and the artist spent the principal part of his career working for the
Duke at his counts at Ghent and Bruges (Cartellieri 213).
Considering the role of the Court of Burgundy as the principal patron of the
northern European Renaissance, it is easy to understand why it served as a model for
many later European courts. Historians often draw attention to the fact that the daily
rituals and ostentatious displays of splendor of Louis XIV's court at Versailles were in
reality a plagiarism of the activities at the court of Philip the Good (Paledilhe 288).
To conclude this r6sum~ of Burgundy's power and greatness in the fifteenth
century, it is appropriate to focus the reader's attention upon the reign of Philip the Good
(1419-1467), for this reign exemplifies the apogee of Burgundy's glory.

Philip's

contributions to art and literature have already been discussed. The reader should also
be aware of Philip's achievements in the political and commercial spheres. Philip's most
significant political accomplishment was the negotiation of the Treaty of Arras,
September 20 1435.

This document represents the apogee of Burgundy's power in

European politics. According to the treaty, King Charles VII of France agreed to cede
to Burgundy several regions of France, including the wealthy cities of the Somme valley.
In addition, the treaty freed Philip from the necessity of doing homage as a vassal to the
French king, thereby elevating Philip to the status of an autonomous sovereign, and
according him the title the "Grand Duke of the Occident." Burgundy's autonomy and

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol32/iss3/1
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sovereign rights were once again a reality in European politics. In the commercial
sphere, Philip the Good's activities were conducive to the expansion of the cities in his
Flemish provinces, especially Ghent, Bruges, Brussels and Liege.

His policies also

improved international trade with Burgundy and accelerated extraordinarily production
in metallurgy. It is often said that his r~ign marked a new phase in the field of mining
(Commeaux 157). In general, the reign of Philip the Good was an unusually stable
period in European history. Like Louis XIV, he ruled a long time, forty-seven years,
and his chancellor, Nicolas Rolin, served him for thirty-nine years. Philip the Good was
responsible for crowning two kings, Louis XI of France and Edward IV of England, for
enabling Pope Eugenius IV to remain pope in spite of the Council of Basel, for the
creation of the Order of the Golden Fleece, for the establishment of a single coinage for
his kingdom, and for the inauguration of the first permanent parliament in French
speaking Europe.

He died the wealthiest prince of his time, leaving a treasure of

400,000 gold crowns, not to mention fabulous tapestries, plate, jewels and the most
magnificent private library on earth (Vaughan, CB, 3). The most convincing evidence
of Philip the Good's genuine greatness is the profoundly respectful and sorrowful attitude
of the Burgundian people upon his death. Their reaction was like that of children who
had lost a very kind father. During his final hours, the people of Burgundy remained all
night in churches, and as the Duke lay in state, his people filed continuously past his
body for two days and nights, while little children ceased playing and cried bitterly in the
streets (Cartellieri 19):
When they came to place his body in the ground, no one could describe
the great pity of the crying of the officers of state and the others: truly,
the Duke's people wanted sincerely, and had to cry, for they were losing
that day a prince, the most renowned on earth,_full of generosity, honor,
courage and valor, in short full of many· noble virtues, who had
preserved all countries in peace" (Commeaux 311, author's translation).
Such was the eminent and powerful condition of the Duchy of Burgundy at the time of
its wars with the Swiss Confederation in 1474-1476.
In order to appreciate fully the nature of the conflict between Switzerland and
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Burgundy, it is also necessary to understand the character of the principal adversary of
the Swiss in the Burgundian Wars, Charles the Bold. This last of the Valois Dukes of
Burgundy has been the victim of much slander and defamation of character. Only the
investigation of the entire spectrum of scholarship on the subject can produce an accurate
image of Charles' true character. Let us consider first Charles' vices which have given
rise to the negative portrayal of his personality, and secondly let us turn our attention to
Charles' virtues, which far outweigh his shortcomings.
Any assessment of Charles the Bold's character must be qualified by the initial
observation that in many of his activities he was simply obeying the dictates of the feudal
civilization of which he was a ·representative. He was usually following the teachings of
his childhood: he was raised to be a powerful feudal lord. Historians too often make the
mistake of evaluating historical figures from the perspective of their own time. This
assertion has never been more true than in the case of Charles the Bold. He has too
often been wrongly accused of cruelty. It was not Charles the Bold who was cruel; it
was his culture that was inherently cruel. The Middle Ages was a callous, bellicose era.
Warfare was endemic in the fifteenth century. France and England had been warring for
more than a hundred years. All feudal rulers were required to wage war if they wished
to protect the interests of their kingdoms from aggressors. The presence of medieval
castles and fortresses on almost every hillside of Europe testifies to the ubiquity of
warfare in the Middle Ages. The bellicose spirit of the time was somewhat tempered by
the urbane ideals of chivalry (Vale 1). Ironically, however, one of these chivalric ideals
was absolute fidelity to an ally whenever he was attacked by a foe. Thus medieval rulers
often took up arms against their better judgment, simply to honor their pledge of
allegiance to an ally. Charles the Bold actually exemplifies the ideals of chivalry better
than many of his contemporaries. If we except his cruelty toward the inhabitants of
Liege in 1468, his harsh treatment of the inhabitants of Nesle during his French campaign
of 1474, and his punishment of the Swiss garrison at Grandson in 1476, we discover that
generally Charles the Bold conducted warfare more humanely than did other rulers of his
time. It is well known, for example, that he did his best to protect the women and
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children of besieged cities (fyler, 160), and that he treated his adversaries in military
campaigns with courtesy (Calmette 176). He certainly was never guilty of the reckless
widescale destruction typifying Henry V's slaughter of the French nobility at Azincourt
in 1415, Emperor Charles V's sack of Rome in 1527 or Napoleon's invasion of Russia
in 1812.
Nonetheless, Charles the Bold did have undeniable vices: insensitivity to public
opinion, pride, ambition, anger and obstinacy. Whereas his predecessors had striven to
ingratiate themselves with the cities of Flanders, Charles the Bold's policy in Flanders
was to extinguish opposition to his rule through swift, and sometimes ruthless, military
action. The most famous example of such harsh action was his suppression of the revolt
of Liege in 1468. Like other French speaking heroes since Roland, Charles the Bold
suffered from the sin of pride. This pride was his greatest weakness and sometimes
prompted him to repel all opposition and to become easily exasperated. The search for
fame, the public expression and display of his own ego, the yearning to be great and to
make a permanent mark upon history were the mainsprings behind his attitudes and
activities. His profound ambition was well known throughout Europe. The Germans
nicknamed him King Ruhmreich (Kingdom of Glory) (Putnam 406). In fact, he did
frankly aspire to recreate and to rule the Kingdom of Burgundy created in the sixth
century, as h~ indicated in his public speech at Dijon in January 1474.

Had his

aspirations been realized, he would have ruled a kingdom extending from the Low
Countries through the Rhine and Rhone Valleys, south to Provence and the
Mediterranean. According to the testimony of his counselor Philippe de Commynes,
Charles yearned for great glory, which was what incited him to war more than anything
else. He would very much have liked to resemble those ancient princes about whom men
have so much talked after their deaths (fyler 161) and decorated his public reception
rooms with tapestries illustrating the exploits of Alexander the Great, Hannibal and Julius
Caesar. His proclivity for sudden, violent fits of anger was notorious. Ironically, he had
inherited this particular vice from his saintly father, Philip the Good.

His violent

temperament drove him at times to strike his soldiers and to speak so harshly to
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subordinates that his fellow knights of the Golden Fleece felt obliged to bring this to his
attention.
Of all his vices, however, Charles the Bold's most serious defect was surely his
obstinacy. He too often rejected the wise advice of his councilors. He often convoked
a council well staffed with worthy people and listened to their deliberations but, after
hearing everything, followed his own opinion, which was usually contrary to what he had
been advised (Vaughan, CB, 167).

Three historical incidents will demonstrate the

dangers to which Charles' obstinacy exposed him. On July 25 1474, Charles negotiated
the Treaty of London with Edward IV of England. According to this treaty, Charles was
to recognize Edward as King of France and to support his invasion of France in June
1475 with the Burgundian army. In return, Burgundy would receive substantial rewards
in treasure and French territory from the English. With a document so favorable to the
interests of Burgundy in his hands, Charles should have directed all his energies to the
preparation for the English invasion in the West. Yet he did exactly the opposite of the
reasonable suggestions of his military advisers: he intervened in the east, in the German
Empire, and spent the winter, spring and summer of 1474-75 besieging the city of Neuss
in the Rhine valley.

This foolish strategy ruined all chances for the success of the

English invasion of France in the summer of 1475.
Related to this first incident is a second, occasioned by the signing of the Treaty
of Picquigny between Louis XI and Edward IV on August 29 1475. Edward had decided
to make peace with the French, precisely because Charles the Bold had failed to keep his
part of the bargain in the Treaty of London and provide the English with the necessary
support troops during their invasion of France. (The English had landed at Calais in
June, but the promised Burgundian troops were not ready to join the English there, being
still occupied with the siege of Neuss.) Rather than admit the seriousness of the loss of
the English alliance and heed the wisdom of his councilors, who cautioned him to desist
from war and to regroup patiently his dispersed army, Charles strode defiantly into the
English camp at Picquigny, conveniently forgot his failure to abide by the conditions of
the Treaty of London, rebuked Edward vehemently for his settlement with the French and
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proclaimed to the English lords and nobles that he had no need of England's help in
order to realize his ambitions for Burgundy. He then invaded Lorraine (admittedly with
success) in the fall of 1475, and immediately afterwards in the winter of 1476, undertook
the expedition against the Swiss, which would be the greatest disaster of his reign.
The third incident revealing the dangers of Charles the Bold's obstinacy occurred
prior to his expedition against Bern in June 1476. His adviser Panigarola did his best to
dissuade him from an attack on the Swiss, stressing the foolhardiness of such an action
considering the weakened state of the Burgundian army after Grandson (March 2, 1476).

In addition, Charles received cogent appeals at the same time from his two allies,
Yolande of Savoy and Duke Galeazzo Maria Sforza of Milan, both pleading with him to
postpone his attack on the Swiss until his army had regained its former strength. In this
case, Yolande proved to be a veritable Cassandra, with her warning of the dangers posed
by the Swiss, "who threaten to overthrow and ruin all princes and nobles" (Vaughan, CB,
382). Notwithstanding so much excellent advice from so many sincere and devoted
advisers, Charles the Bold's decision to confront the Swiss at Murten was adamant. Deaf
to all reason, he was determined to avenge himself on the Swiss for his humiliation at
Grandson or die.
Despite these flagrant vices, twentieth century scholarship has tended to deplore
the defamation of Charles the Bold's character by earlier historians and to illuminate his ·
virtues. This more positive, more just reappraisal of Charles the Bold was initiated in
the late nineteenth century by the English historian John Foster Kirk, definitely the most
eminent biographer of the Duke's life. In this scholar's view history had exaggerated
Charles' defects.

On the contrary, Charles' powers of reasoning were rare and

admirable. With all his impetuosity and sternness, he was guided mainly by a sense of
equity. Disaster exasperated him because it proceeded from attacks which he had done
nothing to provoke and which he had taken all possible pains to avert. 3 The virtues for
which Charles stood conspicuous among princes were his continence, sobriety,
unequalled laboriousness, rigid economy, strict impartiality, inaccessibility to sycophants,
openness to every appeal, and promptness (Kirk, ii. 304). After reading Kirk's excellent
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biography, the reader has the decided impression that Charles the Bold resembles the
heroic protagonist of a Greek tragedy, such as Oedipus Rex, the innocent victim of an
implacable and irrational destiny. The reader also has the strong impression that Charles
the Bold was a misunderstood monarch.

The most cogent evidence of the Duke's

essential goodness is his present reputation among the people of former Burgundy.
Teachers in Burgundy teach children that he was a great man, even greater than the King
of France (Casey 348). Moreover, Charles is portrayed as a good Samaritan in the
popular Burgundian legend of Ysabeau, the fairy of the Jura. Confined to a cavern and
transformed into a serpent, Ysabeau could regain her beauty only if a person with
sufficient goodness of heart were willing to kiss her. Discovering Ysabeau in the grotto,
Duke Charles took pity on her and came to her rescue by giving her serpentine mouth
the liberating kiss (Casey 348). This tale, told by the grandmothers of Burgundy by the
hearthside for generations, exemplifies the respect the people of Burgundy still feel
toward their famous medieval ruler.
In evaluating the conduct of Charles the Bold, it is imperative to remember that
he was the dutiful son of Philip the Good, one of the most distinguished and learned
rulers of European history. Philip trained his son to be an effective feudal monarch, and
Charles responded to the training by being an attentive and obedient pupil of the feudal
chivalric school. In fact, Charles was superior to his father in several ways. In contrast
to Philip the Good, Charles the Bold was a man of personal austerity who shunned the
flippant gaiety of court entertainment. Again, unlike his amorous father, Charles was
chaste (fyler 71). He was completely faithful to his three wives. He was also one of
the most pious princes of Europe.

Mass and vespers were celebrated daily in his

presence. The papal legate at his court reported to the pope in June 1472: "He is very
well resolved in our favor; steadfast, prudent, catholic and devout" (Vaughan, CB, 161).
Charles was also intellectually superior to his predecessors. He carried even further the
patronage of the arts begun by Philip the Bold and Philip the Good. The reader will
recall that his third wife, Margaret of York, was one of the greatest bibliophiles of
Europe.

During his reign the Burgundian· Renaissance reached its zenith.
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attention had been given to Charles' education.

His most prominent teacher was a

scholar from Arras, Antoine Haneron, who founded the College of St. Donat at the
University of Louvain. Charles had a real aptitude for language and could speak Italian
and English fluently. He was one of the best read princes of his day. It was his custom
to read a text of ancient history each evening before retiring.
The historian is equally impressed by Charles the Bald's remarkable sense of
fairness and compassion.

For example, after the conquest of Nancy (November 30

1475), he played the role of a merciful conqueror. No cruelty was permitted, and every
evidence of conciliation was shown (Putnam 410). This incident is typical of Charles'
policy of treating his adversaries with every possible civility. The Duke's daily routine
testifies consistently to his just and compassionate nature. On his staff were an almoner
and his assistant, who distributed substantial sums of money yearly in the Duke's name
to the sick and indigent, including poor prisoners, spinsters, people whose homes had
burned down and bankrupt tradesmen (fyler 48-49). The Duke was always scrupulously
fair in the administration of justice.

Every Monday and Friday Charles personally

presided over the public sessions of the ducal court in order to hear the claims and
petitions "chiefly of the poor and humble who might complain of wrongs done them by
the rich and powerful" (fyler 49).

It should be noted that Charles' French nickname, Charles le Temeraire, does not
accurately describe his character. The adjective "temeraire" implies rashness, whereas
it is well known that Charles was generally meticulous and cautious in his policy making
and military undertakings. The nickname "le temeraire" is a deformation, applied to him
by nineteenth century historians, of his original true nickname "Charles le Travailleur"
(Charles the Hard Worker).

Contemporary witnesses corroborate the truth of this

original appellation. He was much admired and praised by his court historiographer,
Georges Chastellain. Another court chronicler, Olivier de la Marche, placed him among
the great ·heroes of history (Cavellieri 176). According to Commynes, he demonstrated
daily strong physical endurance. Commynes never heard him say that he was tired, nor
ever saw him show fear (fyler 159).

/
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Charles the Bold is particularly renowned for his organizational skills.

He

managed incredibly well a staff of more than five hundred persons. Each morning he
went from room to room of the ducal palace to organize justice, war and finance. He
also paid strict attention to financial matters. "He (Charles) comes very often in person,
and no accounts are certified without him, or without his personal seal being affixed to
them" (Tyler S1). There is, with Charles the Bold, an unprecedented increase in the
amount of autographed Burgundian governmental material; this was a product of his
intense personal involvement in the administration of his territories. Loving order, he
promoted the institutionalization of the Burgundian court: different groups of court
personnel evolved into separate institutions and offices of state.

The entire court

functioned as a personal disciplined section of the Duke's army. He further subdivided
his Grand Council into four committees, or ministries: policy, justice, chapel, and war
· and finance. The councilors' duties were carefully defined. They were to meet twice
a day, in the morning from 8 to 11 AM in winter and from 7 to 10 AM in summer, and
-:._ in the afternoons from 3 to S PM. They were to report daily to the Duke (Vaughan, CB,

195). This system would later profoundly influence the administrative structure of Louis
XIV's court at Versailles and Frederick the Great's court at Berlin.
It is, however, in military affairs that Charles the Bold demonstrated most
dramatically his capacity for organization. The Duke applied himself with ardor and
regularity to the task of disciplining his army. He brooked no opposition to his military
rule.

Burgundian citizens were often drafted for service in the ducal army.

For

example, in the 1476 Swiss campaign, the Burgundian army was composed of both
drafted citizens of Burgundy and Italian, English and German mercenaries. To insure
total obedience to the Duke's orders, the death penalty was imposed upon all draft
dodgers and deserters. Charles the Bold's military reputation depends upon a remarkable
series of ordinances which he issued regulating the organization and discipline of his
armies. These ~eluded: the first thorough attempt to impose rules of military discipline,
the creation of permanent companies divided into squadrons, compulsory drill, and the
first manoeuvres of modem times.
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century army and thus has influenced the military history of the entire European continent
since the Renaissance (Vaughan, CB, 205).

In sum, Charles the Bold's policies

contributed to the improvement and growing prosperity of his state. His alliance with
the English crown had borne fruit in more favorable commercial treaties. His territorial
acquisitions had given greater security to trade. Above all, his domestic administration
had been distinguished by scrupulous regularity in the transaction of ordinary business
and by the vigorous repression of crime.
In addition to his organizational skills, Charles the Bold had abilities as a
'

diplomat. The Treaty of P6ronne, which he negotiated with Louis XI October 14 1468,
is a masterpiece of political efficiency, astuteness and diplomacy. The theme of the
reduction wherever possible of the French crown's powers over Burgundy runs through
the entire document. Every dispute between France and Burgundy is settled here firmly
in Burgundy's favor. With the Treaty of Arras of 1435, this Treaty of P~ronne is one
of the most beneficial documents in the history of Burgundy.
The creation of alliances had been a specialty of Burgundian rulers for centuries,
yet Charles the Bold surpassed his predecessors in this respect, for his system of alliances
in the late fifteenth century was the most extensive and complex in Europe. Charles
loved to surround himself with a multitude of allies. He liked to think that everyone was
his ally, except his archenemy, the King of France. In 1473 he enumerated twenty-six
allies, including nine kings, six dukes, three archbishops, compared to King Louis Xi's
sixteen (Vaughan, CB, 180). Throughout most of his ten-year reign, Charles the Bold
excelled as a diplomat, maintaining ententes with England, Aragon, Savoy, Venice,

Milan, Naples, Hungary and Denmark. It was the habit of the Burgundian dukes to seal
their alliances with marriage whenever possible, and in this respect Charles conformed
to his ancestors' tradition. Himself the offspring of the alliance between Philip the Good
and Isabella of Portugal, Charles was allied more closely with England through his own
marriage July 3 1468 to Margaret of York, the sister of Edward IV. On April 14 1476
he signed at Lausanne the treaty of engagement of his daughter Mary to Duke Maximilian
of Austria, thus laying the foundation for Charles V's powerful Austro-Burgundian-
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Spanish empire later in the sixteenth century. Charles the Bold's most intimate ally was
Savoy, which in earlier times had been a bona fide province of the Kingdom of
Burgundy. In the mid 1470s Savoy had been in effect restored to its former status as a

Burgundian province. An Italian diplomat reported on January 17 1475 that Duchess
Yolande of Savoy was entirely Burgundian and conducted her affairs according to the
wishes of Duke Charles (Vaughan, CB, 305). In view of the sinister and false reputation

given Charles of being the victim of treachery on a systematic scale, it is appropriate to
emphasize that on the contrary many client satellite families and cities remained
steadfastly loyal to the Duke until his fall from power at Nancy in January 1477. The
Houses of Cleves and Nassau, as well as the families of Croys and Neuchatel all
demonstrated an impressive degree of loyalty to Charles.

Tommasso Portinari, a

Florentine banker residing in Bruges, was unusually generous to the Duke, allowing him
to exceed his £6,000 credit limit in order to borrow funds to finance his campaigns

(Vaughan, CB, 258). Many eminent knights of the Golden Fleece, such as Philippe Pot
and Philippe de Cr~vecour, were perfect! y satisfied with Duke Charles' lordship and went
over to France only after Charles' death, and then only because no alternatives were
available to them after Louis Xi's assimilation of the Duchy of Burgundy into his realm.
It was precisely such diplomatic activities which first brought Charles the Bold
into direct contact with the Swiss Confederation.

Charles' alliance with the Swiss

cantons in 1467 against Louis XI had been one of the earliest diplomatic achievements
of his reign (Vaughan, CB, 44-45).

The Swiss had moreover enjoyed intimate

commercial, professional and personal relations with Burgundy for centuries. Indeed,
even during the course of the Burgundian wars of 1474-76, loyalties within some Swiss
families continued to be divided between their own canton and Burgundy.

Jehan

d' Aarberg, lord of Valangin, remained loyal to Bern, while his two sons served in the
Burgundian army. Rudolf, count of Neuchatel, preferred to reside in Bern during the
wars, while his son Philipp von Hochberg was knighted by Duke Charles and fought with
him against the Swiss at Grandson and Murten (Vaughan, CB, 245).
Ironically, on the.eve of the Burgundian Wars, the entente between Burgundy and
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the Swiss confederation was the most cordial in the entire history of diplomatic relations
between the two states. As late as January 1474, a Swiss embassy to Charles the Bold's
court at Ensisheim was treated with the greatest possible hospitality. The Swiss deputies

were impressed on this occasion by the generous way they were received by the Duke,
who sent food and drink to them at their hotel on silver dishes and entertained them with
trumpeters (Vaughan, CB, 276). Two years earlier in February 1472, Charles' reaction
to the rumor that the Swiss cantons had signed a new treaty with Louis XI demonstrates
the extremely high priority which he accorded to Burgundy's traditional Swiss alliance.
Charles was so alarmed by these rumors that he dispatched with great diligence an
express to Bern, inquiring whether a treaty adverse to himself had been formed with the
French King.

The Bernese assured Charles that existing friendly relations between

themselves and Burgundy would be maintained. Nonetheless, Charles valued the Swiss
alliance so highly that his anxiety was not appeased by this simple assurance.
Immediately thereafter, in early March 1472, the Duke sent a special embassy to
Switzerland, to visit all the cantons and the seats of government in each district, and to

receive a fair hearing before the Swiss citizens in order to re-establish a perfect
understanding.

The Burgundian ambassadors reminded the Swiss people of their

numerous treaties with the House of Burgundy and the traditional friendliness between
the two states. The ambassadors further explained to the Swiss Charles' sincere belief
that his recent alliance with Austria, misunderstood as a conspiracy against the Swiss,
was contributing to their safety.

Charles had intended the treaty to operate to the

advantage of the Swiss, and in fact it had done so: the Austrian Duke Sigmund's

aggression against the Swiss had been restrained by the treaty, and greater freedom had
thereby been afforded the Confederation for the pursuit of peaceful commercial
enterprises (Kirk, ii.310).
At Bern, the Burgundian ambassadors were warmly received. Partisans of King
Louis XI did attempt to misrepresent Charles' good intentions, but they were swiftly

rebuked by the Bernese assembly, whose conscience and sense of justice revealed to them
the Duke of Burgundy's sincerity and good will. At this time it was clear to most of the
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Swiss that Charles the Bold was their true ally. The Burgundian ambassadors received
an exceptionally hospitable reception throughout the entire country, in both the rural and
the urban cantons:
But of inimical designs on the part of the Duke of Burgundy, they (the
Swiss) had seen as yet no symptom; and they candidly and cheerfully
admitted that the establishment on the frontier (Alsace) of a friendly in
place of a hostile government, of a regular and equitable·administration
where before there had been restrictions without security and aggression
without order, was a practical gain of which they had daily experience.
It had enabled them to live better ... The condition of Alsace was such as
they had never seen it at any previous period, tranquility everywhere
prevailing, and justice impartially administered. They could travel
without passport, carry their goods without the risk of being plundered,
and transact their business without fear of being defrauded. No
impediment or insult had ever been offered to them, and the Burgundian
officials had always treated them with courtesy, and when necessary, had
them- aid. Such was the testimony borne by the people of
giv
Switzerland to the friendliness, the integrity, the consistency of act and
word, which had marked the conduct of the Duke of Burgundy in his
relations with themselves" (Kirk, ii.322-22).
Thus far has been advanced considerable evidence of the sensitive, compassionate
and illustrious character of Charles the Bold. There can be no doubt that Switzerland's
adversary in the Burgundian wars was a worthy opponent, as well as a former friend and
ally.

Therefore, how can we account for the radical deterioration of the Swiss-

Burgundian entente between the embassy of March 1472, when that entente was at its
zenith, and Bern's declaration of war on Burgundy, October 29, 1474? It will become
clear in the following pages that the successful Burgundian embassy of March 1472 was
not representative of the true relationship between Switzerland and Burgundy at this time.
It was rather an astonishing anomaly in the midst.of events surrounded by an atmosphere
of suspicion and distrust. The ensuing discussion will be divided into two parts, the first
dealing with the Alsatian phase of the Burgundian Wars, the second dealing with the
phase ~f the Burgundian Wars transpiring in the Vaud.
The roots of the conflict can be traced to the Treaty of St. Omer of May 9 1469,
whereby Duke Sigmund of Austria mortgaged to Charles the Bold the Habsburg lands
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in Upper Alsace. The Burgundians' arrival in Alsace aroused the suspicions of their new

neighbors, the Germans and the Swiss, because unlike the former Austrian government
of Alsace, the Burgundians were welsch, or French speaking foreigners, in a thoroughly
Germanic area. Two of the most populous cities on the Rhine, Strasbourg and Basel, felt
particularly threatened. In important respects the Treaty of St. Omer was also a direct
provocation of the Swiss. Burgundy now took the place of the Habsburgs, hitherto the
traditional enemy of Swiss expansion. Bern's interests were most directly thwarted by
the treaty, for Bern had hoped to implement the clause in the Treaty of Waldshut
permitting her to take possession of that place if Sigmund failed to pay her 10,000
Rhenish florins in reparations by June 24 1469.

Now Charles the Bold took over

Sigmund's obligation at St. Omer, and the money was paid over by his emissaries at Bern
June 23 1469, thus preventing Bern's projected annexation of Waldshut.
The fifteenth century Swiss federation was dynamic and expansionist. Neighbors
were forced into dependent alliances or conquered outright. The canton of Bern, the
most westerly canton at the time, was a brilliantly successful empire builder. Bern's
expanding sphere of influence necessarily extended westwards, since her expansion in the
area of the Rhine was blocked by Zurich.

Solothurn, Biel, Fribourg, Murten and

Neuchatel had all become virtuai satellites of Bern. Bern had first come into direct
territorial contact with Burgundy in the Vaud during her westward expansion there. The
Treaty of St. Omer now opened a second frontier between Burgundy and Bern in Alsace,
as Bern strove to annex Waldshut and to form an alliance with Mulhouse, but was
prevented from doing so by the new Burgundian hegemony in the region of the Upper
Rhine. Thus the conflict between Switzerland and Burgundy was ignited in 1469 by
Burgundy's obstruction of Bern's traditional and hitherto unopposed expansionist policy."
The winds of war were fanned by Charles the Bold's appointment of Peter von
Hagenbach as the Burgundian bailiff in Upper Alsace on September 20, 1469. This
decision was one of the gravest errors of Charles' reign, for Hagenbach's tyrannical
behavior completely undermined the entente between Burgundy, Alsace and Switzerland
which Charles was so eager to maintain.
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intense dislike of the Alsatians and the Swiss. During this period, however, Charles was
still determined to preserve the traditional Swiss alliance with Burgundy. He refused, for
example, to accede to Austria's requests for a joint campaign against the Swiss. He
instructed his ambassadors to Sigmund in the spring of 1470 to warn Sigmund of the
danger of provoking the Swiss. Charles further suggested a conference at Zurich at
which he himself would act as mediator to settle the differences between the Swiss and
Sigmund.
Just over a year after Charles' acquisition of Alsace, his bailiff Hagenbach's bad
behavior provoked the Alsatians and the Swiss to confer for the first time on the best
means of dealing with the situation. Hagenbach's threats to take Mulhouse into the
protection of the Duke of Burgundy were deplored, and at this meeting is discerned the
birth of a new political idea, that of an alliance to expel the Burgundians from Alsace.
About the same time, Sigmund of Austria began to lose hope of recovering his ancestral
possessions from the Swiss through a joint attack upon them with Burgundy. The Treaty
of St. Omer had not fulfilled his expectations, and he now turned from plans of attacking
the Swiss to the possibility of arbitration. In October 1471 a peace conference was
convened at Einsiedeln, with the aim of achieving a lasting settlement between the
Austrians and the Swiss. The participants agreed that Sigmund was to regain possession
of the Alsatian lands he had mortgaged to Charles the Bold.

This conference at

Einsiedeln was a further stage toward the formation of a grand alliance against Burgundy.
The chronology of the relations between Burgundy and the Swiss Confederation
during the next phase of their conflict is the essential factor in the explanation and
comprehension of the reasons for the outbreak of war between the two states in 1474.
Charles' initial reaction to the conference at Einsiedeln was to continue to use his
diplomatic skills in an effort to appease the Swiss. In January 1471 he sent one of his
most experienced diplomats, Guillaume de Roch fort, to Bern and her allies to assure
them of his continuing friendship and to propose a peace conference under Burgundian
auspices at Besan~on. The Swiss were not impressed. Another Burgundian ambassador,
Jehan de Bauffremont, arrived at Bern on June 29, 1471 on a similar mission and was
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likewise disregarded. It is true that the third Burgundian embassy to the Swiss in March
1472, described in previous pages, was a brilliant success. However, the success was
more apparent than real, for a month later on April 10 1472, the Confederates resolved
at their diet in Luzern to renounce their recently pledged allegiance to Charles the Bold
and to initiate negotiations for a peace settlement with Charles' rival Sigmund. Upon
hearing this news, for the first time in his reign, Charles the Bold actively engaged in
serious negotiations for war against the Swiss: in an effort to thwart the Swiss
rapprochement with Austria, Charles sent Peier von Hagenbach on embassy to Sigmund

to discuss joint military action against Switzerland.
How do we account for this apparently irrational sequence of events? Charles
the Bold's war negotiations with Sigmund were clearly prompted by his exasperation with
the Swiss. After investing so much time, money and effort on the cultivation of the

Swiss entente, the Swiss Confederation repaid him for his sincere good will by rejecting _
his diplomatic suggestions a month after his embassy there and pursuing a course of
action at their diet in Luzern to the detriment of Burgundy. On the other hand, the Swiss
anti-Burgundian decisions at the diet of Luzern in April 1472, apparently contradicting
the ubiquitous professions of Swiss friendship with Burgundy during the embassy of
March 1472, were in reality prompted by a deep rancor and understandable discontent
over the misconduct of Charles' bailiff in Alsace, Peter von Hagenbach, which Charles'
extraordinarily charming March embassy failed to extinguish and which Charles hhnself
failed to appease. This oversight would be one of the costliest blunders of Charles the
Bold's reign. If we read carefully the transcripts of the Swiss replies to the famous
Burgundian embassy of March 1472, we perceive in the profusion of professions of
friendship for Duke Charles and Burgundy, an ominous leitmotif: a series of complaints
about the rudeness and tyranny of Hagenbach and a series of requests to Charles to order
Hagenbach to behave more graciously in future with their Alsatian allies. Singly, each
of these complaints was trivial, but together they produced a storm of protest when the
Swiss confederates convened at their diet in Luzern in April 1472. Had Charles the Bold
taken seriously this Swiss dissatisfaction over Hagenbach and disciplined his tyrannical
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bailiff of Alsace, he could have preserved the Swiss alliance, so vital for the future
prosperity of Burgundy.

Instead, his neglect of the issue of dis_satisfaction with

Hagenbach catalyzed a series of misunderstandings between himself and the people of the
Upper Rhine, as well as the rapid deterioration of his diplomatic ties with the Swiss
Confederation.
At the beginning of 1473 Hagenbach's aggressive activities once again
significantly accelerated the evolution toward an anti-Burgundian alliance. On January
22 1473 he badgered the imperial city of Mulhouse for the third time to open her gates

to Duke Charles. A month later, at Luzern on February 24 1473, the Swiss diet resolved
in principle to work with the imperial towns of the Upper Rhine in common defense
against Burgundy. The climax came at a conference at Basel on- March 14 1473. A
project for a ten-year alliance was drawn up between the bishop of Strasbourg and Basel,
the margrave of Baden and the towns of Strasbourg, Basel, Colmar and Selestat on one
side and the Swiss with Mulhouse on the other:

"If any foreign welsch people try

unjustly by force to take away the liberties of or detach from the Holy Empire one or
more members of this alliance, we others shall help and advise them truly in whatever
way we and they consider necessary" (Vaughan, CB, 273-74).

This document is

important in that it highlights the sense of ethnic unity among the Alsatian and Swiss
people.
In the summer of 1473 Charles the Bold made a final effort to restore his former
alliance with the Swiss, nullified by the escalation of hostilities in April and May, 1472.
Augusto de Lignano, the abbot of the Italian monastery of Casanova, undertook the
embassy on Charles' behalf. In exchange for this alliance, Charles was prepared to offer
the Swiss the four Black Forest towns of Waldshut, Sackingen, Laufenburg and
Rheinfelden. However, the Swiss ignored this embassy for the same reasons they had
ignored Charles' previous embassies: the Duke of Burgundy was attempting to swing the
hostile Swiss over to himself with a theoretical and idealistic scheme, while ignoring the
practical irritation and provocation to which Hagenbach was constantly subjecting them
in Alsace.
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As usual, the initiative in the next round of negotiations for an alliance against

Burgundy was urban. Strasbourg raised the matter with Bern at the end of 1473. On
March 27 1474 at Constance the various negotiations reached a definitive stage with the
opening of a conference, as the Basel cleric Johann Knebel put it, "to consider the peace
of the land and how to extricate it from the tyranny of the Duke of Burgundy and his

wicked bailiff Peter von Hagenbach" (Vaughan, CB, 278). The resulting League of
Constance contained four separate elements: first, the principle of everlasting peace
between Austria and Switzerland was accepted. Second, a ten-year defensive alliance of
Upper Rhine powers was created. Third, Duke Sigmund was to redeem his lands in
Upper Alsace mortgaged to Charles the Bold in 1469; the money for the transaction was
to be paid over to Charles by the towns and deposited at Basel. Finally, on April 4 1474
a ten-year alliance was signed between the towns of Basel, Strasbourg, Colmar and
Selestat, on the one side, and, on the other, the Swiss Confederates with Solothurn
(Vaughan, CB, 278-29). This League of Constance was defensive in character. It was
urban in nature: its creators were Basel, Strasbourg, Zurich and Bern.
In the spring of 1474 it was becoming increasingly clear that the future prospects
of Charles the Bold depended on the course of events in Alsace which in their turn were
contingent on the behavior of Peter von Hagenbach. At the end of March Charles sent
an embassy to Basel proclaiming his friendship, but complaining of the city's plan to join
an alliance with the Swiss and other members of the League of Constance. Basel retorted
that the good will with which she had originally accepted the extension of Burgundian

power into Alsace had been nullified by the intolerable conduct of Hagenbach. The
Alsatians found it impossible to continue to accept him as bailiff in the area. In the
months between Charles' departure from Alsace on January 11 1474 and the presentation
of these complaints against him at Basel on April 6 1474, Hagenbach's behavior had
become increasingly indecorous and offensive. On April 10 1474 the citizens of Breisach
had him arrested, and on May 9 1474 he was beheaded. For Charles the Bold the
execution of Hagenbach and the loss of Alsace were critical events. They were his first
serious failures, arousing an irrational desire for revenge and provoking the obstinate and
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aggressive side of his character which was to become increasingly apparent in the years
that followed.
By May of 1474 Bern was dynamically anti-Burgundian. Given Charles the
Bold's failure to respond to Swiss demands for the discipline of Hagenbach, given
Charles' record of suppression of urban rights in Flanders, and given Bern's own frankly
expansionist policy in the Vaud, contested by Burgundy, it was only logical that the
proud and highly independent Bern would resist the Burgundian presence in its
neighborhood. The promotion of the Burgundian Wars was the work, above all, of
Austria, Strasbourg and Bern (Vaughan, CB, 292). Contemporary historiography gives
priority to Bernese ambitions and initiatives as the principal elements catalyzing the
outbreak of these wars (Morard 281, Schaufelberger, 317), whereas past scholarship had
stressed the clandestine bribery and persuasion of Louis XI as factors inducing the Swiss
· to take up arms against Burgundy. It is a gross misrepresentation to claim that Louis XI
persuaded the Swiss into a war with Charles the Bold, as the research of Vaughan,
Bittmann, and Gasser has proven. It must be admitted, however, that French cash did
help to bring the less aggressive Swiss cantons into line with Bern. It is imperative to
note that the first actual military action in the conflict was initiated not by Charles the
Bold, but rather by the League of Constance: at the end of June 1474 a raiding force
from Alsace penetrated Burgundy. Duke Charles understandably found this aggression
of his sovereign territory illegitimate and intolerable, and he naturally responded with a
Burgundian raid into Alsace on August 18. This latter attack had a dramatic impact, and
Bern in particular went as far as ordering her troops on August 22 to be ready to leave
at once. ,The Swiss declaration of war on Charles the Bold was delivered on October 29

. 1474 to Henri de Neuchatel at his castle of Blamont in the Franche-Comte. Emperor
Frederick III of Germany was named in this document as the immediate instigator of this
hostile challenge (Schilling, i.174-75).

The target of the first allied attack was the

strategically placed castle of Hericourt, on the frontier of the Franche-Comte near
Belfort. This frontier raid against Burgundy was in no real sense the work of the Swiss.

It was due, as the declaration of war clearly stated, primarily to the initiative of Frederick

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol32/iss3/1

28

et al.: Full Issue

28
III of Germany, Sigmund of Austria and the towns of the League of Constance. The
Alsatian phase of the Burgundian Wars was their war, and in part Bern's, which the other
Swiss cantons had reluctantly agreed to support (Vaughan, CB, 294-95).
Nonetheless, the Swiss did keep their promise to the League of Constance and
fought valiantly in the Alsatian campaign. When hostile incursions into the FrancheComt6 were resumed in July 1475, the plan of action demanded by Basel and Strasbourg
was effectively carried out: the elimination of a group of frontier places from which
Burgundian garrisons had been raiding Alsace. In all, in the summer of 1475, the allied
forces conquered some dozen castles in the northeast of the Franche-Comt6.

At

Grammont, which was successfully assaulted on August 21, the Bernese and other victors
were able to refresh themselves at the end of three hours of siege with a cellar full of
wine.
The second phase of the Burgundian Wars between October 1475 and June 1476,
which transpired almost entirely in the Vaud, was a much more earnest, patriotic and
united endeavor for the ensemble of the Swiss Confederation than had been the Alsatian
overture. Initiated by Bern, this phase of the conflict, by the time of the Battles of
Grandson and Murten, was characterized by a far higher degree of coordination and
cooperation among the cantons. What sequence of events enabled Bern to overcome the
traditional recalcitrance of the other cantons in acquiescing to her demands and to
coordinate a degree of military unity unprecedented in the history of Switzerland? The
well organized Swiss military expeditions to Grandson and Murten were the result not
only of Bern's arts of persuasion but also of the development of Switzerland into a great
military power in the late fifteenth century.

Although unwilling to sacrifice their

independence on the altar of centralization, the Swiss cantons had created a military
organization in many ways as efficient as that of Charles the Bold.

Swiss military

prowess at this time can be ascribed to essentially three factors: the confidence which the
Swiss had acquired following their outstanding victories over the Austrian Habsburgs at
Sempach (1386) and during the Old Zurich War (1436-50), the oath which the cantons
had solemnly sworn at the Sempach Convention to give mutual military help at times of
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national emergency, the speed and adroitness with which each canton, obedient to and
inspired by the Oath of Sempach, was able to assemble and deliver troops to the site of
battle. In addition, in the late fifteenth century the principal expansionist activity in the
Swiss Confederation was Bern's expansion into the Vaud. Although not historically
justified, this Bernese westward expansion did serve to enrich the entire Confederation,
and thus it was in the national interest to protect it. Clearly, on the domestic level, the
Burgundian Wars counteracted the other cantons' traditional antipathy toward the
hegemony of Bern.
At that time the Vaud was a province of the Duchy of Savoy. From about 1460
onward Bern had displayed an increasing and somewhat sinister interest in Savoy's
internal affairs; by the end of that decade this amounted to outright intervention and
interference.

The internal equilibrium of Savoy had been preserved because the

· ambitions there of Duke Galeazzo Sforza of Milan, of Louis XI, of Charles the Bod, and
of Bern had tended to counterbalance each other. - But this balance of power was upset
completely in 1472-75 when Charles the Bold managed not only to win Yolande, Duchess
of Savoy, firmly over to a Burgundian alliance, but also to establish a Burgundian
protectorate over the duchy. Although his antagonism of Bern was inadvertent, he was
now directly threatening Bern's interests. If Bern were awaiting a pretext to initiate acts
of aggression against Savoy, Charles' alliance with Yolande would have been sufficient.
But Charles went much further than this. In 1472 he took into his service and pay
Jacques, count of Romont, also baron of Vaud, which was an appanage of Savoy. This
baron was the virtual ruler of the entire pays de Vaud. Thus the Vaud passed into
Burgundian hands, and Jacques de Savoie was added, in the suspicious eyes of Bern, to
the numerous Burgundian vassals already in the area. The Vaud was not only important
to Bern as a field for expansion; it was also of immense economic significance. Indeed,
Bern's initial policy of expansion there had been dictated by economic considerations.
The Vaud produced an abundance of corn, wine and other agricultural products, and it
was one of the main highways for Swiss and German merchants travelling to the fairs of
Geneva and Lyon. No wonder Bern reacted in~ hostile manner to these developments.
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From then on Bern began to plan a series of countermoves designed to undermine
Burgundian influence in the Vaud.
From the spring of 1473 Italian mercenaries recruited by Charles the Bold began

to pass through Savoy in increasing numbers, and these activities were angrily resented
by Bern. After a series of bitter complaints, she presented an ultimatum to Yolande in
January 1475: the count ofRomont must leave Charles the Bold's service and the passage
of Burgundian mercenaries through her territories must be stopped forthwith. Otherwise
Bern would invade the Vaud. Bern's suspicion was exacerbated when the Treaty of
Moncalieri (January 30 1475) created an even stronger alliance between Savoy, Burgundy
and Milan. A new Burgundian state was forming to the west of Bern. Early in May
1475 Bern and her associates seized the castles and lands of the Burgundian vassals in
the Vaud, and on August 16 they tried unsuccessfully to intercept a contingent of
Charles' Italian recruits at Aigle.
The motives behind Bern's invasion of the Vaud October 14 1475 were complex.
Firstly, she continued to resent Burgundian interference with her free trade in the Vaud.
Duke Amadeux IX of Savoy had recently ruled that goods from Germany, brought into
Savoy en route to the fairs of Lyon, must first be offered for sale at Geneva. Although
goods from Bern and Fribourg were exempt from this regulation, merchandise from other
German towns was not. Consequently an economic grievance against Savoy and its
Burgundian allies was widely felt among the south German towns and was certainly
shared by Bern and Fribourg, who foresaw in this situation the increasing future
regulation of their trade with France by Burgundy. Secondly, Bern was anxious to stop
the movement of Italian troops through the Alps on their way to join the Burgundian
army, rightly fearing that they might be used against herself.

Thirdly, she was

determined to do the utmost to extend her sphere of influence southwards toward Lake
Geneva and the Rhone valley. Finally, the immediate reason for the October campaign
was to protect the garrisons she had established at the beginning of the summer in Jogne,
Orbe and Grandson.

By the end of October the entire Vaud had submitted to the

victorious troops of Bern and Fribourg, joined by contingents from Luzern, Zurich and

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive,

31

Swiss American Historical Society Review, Vol. 32 [], No. 3, Art. 1

31
Solothum. It was a brief campaign, and after having reinforced the garrisons of Yverdun
and Grandson, on November 2 the Swiss returned home.
Charles the Bold responded to this Swiss invasion by his own military expedition
to the Vaud in January 1476. The motives for his aggressive response were essentially
twofold. Charles the Bold could not ignore the Swiss invasion of the Vaud. The count
of Romont was one of his leading captains and Duchess Yolande was his ally. Feudal
ethics dictated unquestioned fidelity and assistance to one's ally; such fidelity was a
cornerstone of the foundation of medieval feudal society. In this case, it was especially
necessary to come to the rescue ·o f Duchess Yolande because of the long tradition of
mutual defense treaties uniting Burgundy and Savoy; the first such treaties had been
negotiated in 1369 and 1379 by Philip the Bold. In his letter to the count of Romont
announcing his intention to fight the Swiss and Germans in the Vaud, dated November
28 1475, Charles made clear the moral necessity of avenging the humiliation which his
ally, Duchess Yolande, had suffered at the hands of these invaders (Vaughan, CB, 36566). Secondly, if the Vaud was indispensable to Bern as a trade route, the region was
likewise indispensable to Charles the Bold as a route for the transport of his military
supplies. Geography dictated that his military lifeline, the stream of Italian recruits for
his army, must go through the Great St. Bernard Pass and along the Rhone to Lake
Geneva. This lifeline was temporarily cut when Bern attacked Aigle in August and again
in October 1475 when the Swiss occupied Morges. Bern's ally, Bishop Walter Supersax
of Sion, had also conquered the lower Valais. Thus the route from Italy was effectively
blocked by the Swiss. Such a dramatic conflict of interests was certain to produce an
explosive military conflict between Burgundy and Switzerland.
We must now consider the serious subject of Swiss guilt in the Burgundian Wars.
This guilt is undeniable and results from two factors. Firstly, many criminal acts and
atrocities were committed by Swiss soldiers during the initial campaign in the Vaud. On
May 3 1475, after the conquest of the castle of Orbe, both living and dead defenders
were thrown over the battlements by the Swiss invaders. This was a Swiss military
custom of the time (Vaughan, CB, 305). At Estavayer on October 17 a savage massacre
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followed the Swiss capture of the town; it was pillaged and its castle burned down. The
Fribourgeois are said to have dismantled and removed to their own town the entire
equipment of Estavayer's cloth manufacturing industry. The authorities at Bern were
themselves so shocked by the atrocities at Estavayer that they severely reprimanded their
captains for permitting such inhuman cruelties (Vaughan, CB, 363). In addition, the
Vaudois castles of Ste. Croix, Les Cl~es and La Sarraz were assaulted, burned down and
their garrisons butchered.

Compare this criminal conduct with Charles the Bold's

Lausanne ordinance, detailing the orders for the march on Murten in June 1476.
According to this ordinance, Burgundian officers were to allow no violation of churches
or women during the campaign (Vaughan, CB, 211). Charles the Bold has often been
blamed for the atrocities at Grandson February 28 1476, just before the Swiss victory
there, when he ordered 200 Swiss soldiers of the captured garrison to be hanged or
drowned in the lake. Once again in this instance the historical facts will mollify and
justify Charles' conduct. Charles decided to execute the garrison at Grandson as a result
of the understandably strong demands for vengeance from the people of nearby Estavayer
and Yverdun, both themselves the recent victims of Swiss cruelty: the execution of these
Swiss was not his own idea (Barante 674). In addition, his officers advised him that such
a stern form of punishment would terrify the Swiss and hasten the war's conclusion. In
other words, Charles was persuaded to execute the Swiss prisoners by an appeal to the
same kind of reasoning as that which Harry Truman's advisers employed to persuade him
to order the use of the atomic bomb at Hiroshima in 1945.
The Swiss were guilty of misconduct in the Vaud campaign of 1475-76 for a
second reason: their invasion was an unlawful transgression of sovereign territory, the
Duchy of Savoy. Duchess Yolande and Charles the Bold were both the victims of this
transgression. It is imperative at this point to note that neither the Alsatian nor the Vaud
phase of the Burgundian wars were initiated by Burgundy; in both instances the
Burgundian government's initial display of military force was provoked by the
unwarranted and illegitimate invasion of its sovereign territory (H~ricourt) or that of its
allies (the Vaud, Savoy).
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Moreover it is imperative for the reader to understand that Charles the Bold and
his councilors had every right to regard the Swiss invasion of the Vaud as an affront to
the dignity and sovereignty of Burgundy. The Vaud, like the regions of Geneva and the
Valais, was still a bona fide part of the region of Burgundy. The cursory observation of
maps of early medieval Europe reveals that the original Kingdom of Burgundy established
in the sixth century embraced these three Swiss cantons. Indeed, the area surrounding
Lake Geneva was the heart of this original Burgundian state. This early Kingdom of
Burgundy was no artificial political creation; it was an enduring racial and cultural
reality.

After the fall of Rome present day . Switzerland was divided between two

Germanic tribes, the Burgundians and the Alemanni. The Alemanni resided to the east
of the River Reuss, the Burgundians to the west. In later centuries the Alemanni pushed
the Burgundian Kingdom to the west of the River Saane, and this still remains the
dividing line between French and German Switzerland (Gilliard 10). Several scholars
have pointed out that the racial division of Switzerland remains practically the same today
as it was after the early Germanic invasions (McCracken 31, Gilliard 10, Martin 12,
Calmette 3).
In other words, the citizens of the cantons of Geneva, the Vaud and the Valais
are still primarily racially Celts and Burgundians. If we define a state as an assembly of
people united by a common racial and ethnic heritage, then the people of these three
cantons were still in 1476 definitely within the orbit of Burgundy's sovereignty. Their
official ruler at this time was the Duke of Savoy, whose ancestors had usurped the rights
of the legitimate Burgundian Kings in the region in the late twelfth century. Their true

sovereign was the Duke of Burgundy. In his effort to annex Savoy, Geneva, the Vaud
~d the Valais, Charles the Bold was simply exercising his right as the sovereign of
Burgundy to call his people back to the home of their ancestors.

Scholarship has

illuminated this "natural" quality of the Duchy of Burgundy. With the exception of the
Counties of Flanders, Hainaut, Artois, and the Duchies of Luxembourg, Brabant and
Guelder, all the territories of Burgundy in 1476 were part of the original racially
homogeneous Kingdom of Burgundy. Moreover, the growth of the Burgundian state in
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the late Middle Ages had been surprisingly rapid and unchecked; even those northern
areas which were not ethnically Burgundian had not resisted Burgundian expansionism.
Province after province had been added without serious dispute (Kirk, ii.307). Burgundy
was, for example, certainly a more homogeneous and natural state than was the AustroHungarian Empire. Indeed, the only "unnatural" thing about Burgundy in 1476 was the
absence of the people of Savoy, Geneva, the Vaud and the Valais among its citizens

within its borders. They were, and many still are, Burgundians, and Burgundy had every
right to claim them as its own. The Treaty of Arras in 1435 had formally attested
Burgundy's sovereignty. In terms of international law, Charles the Bold's campaign in
the Vaud was a legitimate extension of Burgundy's legally recognized sovereign rights
into a province of the former Kingdom of Burgundy. Thus Charles the Bald's expedition
to the Vaud in January 1476 was double justified: he was punishing the Swiss for their
wartime atrocities there, and he was asserting his rights as the legitimate sovereign of the
Burgundian people in the region (Paledilhe 342).
The Burgundian Wars can be interpreted on four separate levels. On the first
level, they were a struggle between Burgundy and Bern for hegemony in the Vaud. On
the second level, these wars represent the Swiss cantons' effort to prevent the obstruction
by Burgundy of their free trade with Geneva and the Rhone valley. On a third level, the
Burgundian Wars represent a struggle between urban independence and royal regulation
of laws and trade. Charles the Bald's real enemy was neither Louis XI nor Sigmund of
Austria; it was the towns of the Low Countries, the Upper Rhine and the Swiss
Confederation. In 1476 there were only three relatively well organized nation states in
Europe: Spain, France and Austria. The entire Germanic region between Austria and
France was composed of a conglomeration of small autonomous city states, duchies and
principalities. This Germanic zone had no experience of powerful central royal authority
since the demise of the Hohenstaufen dynasty in the mid-thirteenth century. As for the
Swiss Confederation, it had resisted successfully every attempt by the Austrian Habsburg
Empire to assimilate it since 1291. This spirit of urban independence was particularly
strong in the regions of the Upper Rhine and the Swiss Alps. For nearly two centuries
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the towns of this area had been accustomed to governing themselves without foreign or
royal interference. Charles the Bold's imperialistic ambitions in Alsace, and his policies
of centralization and trade regulation, were incompatible with the practices and
aspirations of these German and Swiss towns and were stubbornly opposed by these
communities.
On a fourth and final level, the Burgundian Wars represent the first phase of the
great struggle between feudal absolutism and nascent democracy which would 'culminate
centuries later in -the American, French and Russian Revolutions. Although absolutism
would be even more widespread in Europe after the Burgundian Wars in the seventeenth,
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries-, this conflict is significant because it is the first
example of the victory of an international army of free cities and citizens over a Prince,
which would serve as a precedent for future revolutionary struggles.

Furthermore,

although the Alsatian and German cities participating in the Burgundian Wars would later
lose their sovereignty and be incorporated into the French and German Empires, their
Swiss comrades in those wars never yielded to similar external imperialism, with the
exception of the brief assimilation of Switzerland into Napoleon's Empire between 1798
and 1803. Moreover, the Battles of Grandson and Murten, like the earlier Battles of
Morgarten and Sempach, Crecy and Azincourt, demonstrated the inferiority of the feudal
organization of Austria, France and Burgundy to the peasant soldiery of Switzerland and
the English yeomanry (Kirk, ii.363). Like Louis XIV and Charles I, Charles the Bold
believed that he ruled by divine right. In July 1475 he pointed out to the Flemish that
his authority came from God and that they could find justification for the powers of
pr_inces set out in the Book of Kings (Vaughan, CB, 179).

Such a philosophy of

government was contrary to the political principles of the Swiss Confederation, whose
raison d'~tre since 1291 had been the rejection of authority exercised by a central power
and the preservation of the political power of the individual at the local level. The
irreconcilable differences between the autocracy of Burgundy and the democracy of the
Swiss Confederation exacerbated the misunderstandings between the two states.
There is a great deal of pathos in the story of Switzerland's wars with Burgundy
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in the late Middle Ages. We have already drawn the reader's attention to the similarities
between Charles the Bold and the protagonists of Greek tragedy. His three military
disasters at Grandson, Murten and Nancy are also often compared to the three acts of a
tragedy. He was often wrongly maligned by his contemporaries, who magnified his
suppression of urban rights in Flanders and paid little attention to his impressive
achievements in Burgundy, where he served as a model of piety for his people, created
an exemplary political and economic organization and encouraged the development of
parliamentary government in the Councils of Dijon and Lille. Such slander and libel
naturally intensified Charles' unfortunate proclivity for anger and outbursts of rage.
There is much pathos on the Swiss side of the conflict as well. The cantons' legitimate
protest against Hagenbach's misbehavior in Alsace, expressed at the diet of Luzern in
April 1472, and their subsequent negotiations with Austria, were misinterpreted by
Charles as a declaration of war against himself. The reader will recall that this incident
was the catalyst for Burgundy's first serious preparations for war against Switzerland.
Toe good will of the majority of the Swiss toward their long time friendly neighbor
Burgundy, so dramatically expressed during the Burgundian embassy of March 1472, was
eclipsed by the ambitions of a minority of Bernese merchants and politicians, who wished
to eliminate Burgundy's competition with their commercial enterprises in the Vaud. (It
is common knowledge that Zurich and the eastern cantons came to Bern's rescue at
Grandson only because of a flood of written appeals Bern had been sending to them for
months and because of the legal necessity to honor their pledge of mutual aid, attested
by the League of Constance) (Morard 290). Some Swiss families lost fathers, sons and
brothers because of these men's ties of allegiance to Burgundy and their voluntary
decision to fight on Burgundy's side against their compatriots. Thus from the Swiss point
of view, the Burgundian Wars had all the pathos of a civil war.
The

Burgundian

Wars

were

propelled

by

this

series

of

pathetic

misunderstandings. They were accelerated by Charles the Bold's enigmatic insensitivity
to the tyrannical conduct of his bailiff in Alsace, peter von Hagenbach, so inconsistent
with Charles' otherwise sensitive and scrupulously just nature. They were concluded by
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the victory of the democratic Alsatian and Swiss towns over the feudal state of Burgundy.
Most Swiss historians justify Swiss aggression in this conflict by stressing the
economic necessi~y of the venture. Failure to expel Burgundy from the Vaud and the
V alais would have led to the establishment of a powerful Burgundian kingdom in the
region which would have regulated and obstructed the free movement of trade between
the Swiss Confederation and the important urban trade centers of the Rhone valley.
These historians further stress that the victories at Grandson and Murten laid the
foundation for the annexation to the Confederation of the Vaud (1~03), the Valais (1815)
and Geneva (1815) which have since contributed so much to the economic prosperity and
intellectual advancement of the entire Swiss nation. While we agree with these historians
that Burgundian hegemony in the Vaud and the Valais would have impaired the Swiss
economy and while we value the essential role played by the Vaud and the Valais in the
life of contemporary Switzerland, it is also important to consider the point of view of
Charles the Bold, who was understandably exasperated by the hostility of the Swiss, a
people whose territory he had never directly attacked and whose friendship he had
consistently sought to cultivate. Charles' exasperation with the Swiss is further justified

in that his policy of expansion never included any intent to annex Swiss territories but
rather was consistently dictated by the reacquisition of former territories of the Kingdom
of Burgundy, unjustly usurped by France and the Duchy of Savoy.

The theory of

Charles the Bold's deliberate and malevolent "encirclement" of Switzerland is pure
speculation, which has no basis in historical fact.

His activities in the Vaud were

designed to restore the rightful Kingdom of Burgundy in the region; they were never

deliberately nocuous to Swiss interests.
We must correct two further misunderstandings about this already grotesque
tragedy of misunderstandings. Firstly, today it is extremely difficult for us to divorce
the conc~pts of Geneva, the Vaud and the Valais from the concept of Switzerland, so
thoroughly unified are these Francophone cantons with the rest of the Confederation. Yet
the events of the Burgundian Wars transpired more than three centuries before the
annexations of these three cantons to the Confederation. No one in the late fifteenth
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century considered Geneva, the Vaud and Valais to be "Swiss." The people of that time
perceived these regions as part of the Duchy of Savoy, and those with any knowledge of
history knew that until the end of the twelfth century they had been provinces of the
Kingdom of Burgundy. We have already demonstrated that Charles the Bold 's expedition

to the Vaud in 1476 was a legitimate effort to rescue the kingdom of his ancestors from

foreign aggression. Subconsciously, however, we in the late twentieth century, because
of our perceptions of the Vaud as fundamentally Swiss, attribute inappropriately a

pejorative imperialist motive to Charles' expedition there.

There is absolutely no

historical justification for this particular negative judgment of Charles the Bold, and it
should be discarded. Whatever his shortcomings, in the Vaud campaign of 1476 Charles
the Bold was definitely participating in the justified defense of the sovereign territory of
Savoy and Burgundy.
Secondly, we deplore the paucity of contemporary scholarship dealing with
Charles the Bold's excellent diplomatic relations with the Swiss until April 1472, in other
words during the first five years of his ten year reign. During the first half of his reign,
and for centuries before that, the Burgundians and the Swiss had lived together in
harmony. Too much recent scholarship has exaggerated Charles' callous treatment of the
Swiss and Alsatian towns and his antipathy for democracy. Such scholarship has failed

to give credit to Charles for his efforts to understand and to assist his neighbors and his
allies. For example, in several recent impressive texts treating the Burgundian Wars,
there is no mention of Charles' important embassy to the Swiss in March 1472, one of
the most extraordinarily successful diplomatic achievements in European history. The
reader will recall the ubiquity and the sincerity of the good will with which the Swiss
people received this embassy from Burgundy. Failure to appreciate its significance is a
grave error of historical judgment. The warm reception of Charles' ambassadors by so
many Swiss people from so many different backgrounds is an accurate thermometer of
his excellent reputation, and it provides cogent evidence of the rightness of many of his
policies of government. For too long certain Swiss television programs have likened
Charles the Bold's expulsion from the Vaud to Lucifer's expulsion from Paradise. It is
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imperative that serious students of Swiss history in 1996 have a less melodramatic and
more objective perspective upon the Duke of Burgundy's true character.
We have established the essentially tragic nature of the strife between Switzerland
and Burgundy. In conclusion, let us trace the three stages of the denouement of this
tragedy, leading to the demise of the Duchy of Burgundy: the Battles of Grandson,
Murten and Nancy. The rapid defeat of the Burgundian army at Grandson was the
consequence of two events. Firstly, a panic began in the Burgundian ranks as a result
of a withdrawal of their own troops from in front of the Swiss vanguard. Charles the
Bold had ordered this withdrawal either to persuade the enemy to advance farther so that
they could more easily be encircled or in order to train his artillery on them, but the
movement was misinterpreted as a retreat. The other event responsible for Burgundy's
defeat that day was the arrival on the scene of the rest of the Swiss army, which had
made its way as fast as possible through the surrounding woods to come to the help of
the advance party. The emergence of the Swiss troops from the forest, both from the
hills above and the shore of Lake Neuchatel below, making terrible noises with their
horns, served to exacerbate the terror of the Burgundians, who never stopped to offer
them battle. The Swiss chased and killed them from Vaumarcus to Montagny. The
fleeing Burgundians left nearly all their baggage and heavy equipment behind. The Swiss
thereby captured a priceless treasure of tapestries, tents, plate, books, reliquaries,
diamonds, jewels, clothing, weapons, and gold and silver coins.'
As mentioned earlier, Charles the Bold refused to be daunted by his defeat at
Grandson and resolved three months later to meet the Swiss and their allies again at
Murten. On this occasion the Duke was accompanied by an army of 12,000 combatants.
Saturday morning, June 22 1476 was dull and wet. The allied troops had not slept all
night. The allied army at Murten, composed of contingents representing all the members
of the League of Constance, was substantially larger than that of Grandson and numbered
about 25,000 men in all. Despite reports, which reached the Duke of Burgundy during
the morning, of an enemy advance through the nearby woods, he persisted in the false
belief that no attack was coming, and the Burgundian army was consequently taken
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completely by surprise when the allied vanguard emerged from the forest in battle
formation. There was no time for the entire Burgundian army to form up on the plateau
south of Burg during the twenty minutes it took the allied vanguard to advance from the
forest edge.

The allies continued to advance, meeting only minor resistance, and

separated into several contingents, some swinging left to the south, others continuing
straight toward Murten. Charles himself was slow in putting on his armor. By the time
he reached the plateau, all hope o~ forming a line of battle against the enemy advance
was lost and most of his troops were alre~dy dead or dispersed. The flight of the
Burgundians became general. The attack had been so swift and unexpected that some
Burgundians were even killed in their tents. The only effective escape route along the
shore of Lake Murten became hopelessly blocked, and hundreds of Burgundians were
driven into the water and killed or drowned there. The allies, obeying the battle orders
laid down by the federal diet on March 18 1476, killed all the enemy they encountered
and took no prisoners. The carnage was extensive and prolonged. Charles had lost onethird of his army. He was the victim of one of the most destructive and decisive battles
in the military history of the Middle Ages.
Despite their severity, the defeats at Grandson and Murten did not result in the
immediate collapse of Burgundian power. That event would be catalyzed by the Battle
of Nancy six months later in January 1477. Amazingly, the administration of Charles
the Bold's territories seems to have continued working quite effectively right to the end
of his reign. In addition, the Duke was supremely successful, even at the end of his

reign, in obtaining money from his subjects to finance his military ventures. Charles'
resolve to ~e Nancy, the capital of Lorraine, in the autumn of 1476 was by no means
foolhardy; it was based on the reasonable supposition that Nancy would fall before the
insipid Duke Ren~ of Lorraine could obtain the assistance he had been refused by allies
so often before. After all, at this point, Charles had no reason to fear Louis XI, who had
consistently refused to lend serious assistance to Ren~ in the past. Moreover, his former
enemies, the Swiss, had refused Louis' proposal in September 1476 to continue the war
against Burgundy, and at the end of that year the Swiss were under pressure from Pope
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Sixtus IV to make peace with Charles the Bold. We know now that the Swiss were in
fact preparing to make peace with Burgundy in November 1476, provided Charles
withdrew from Lorraine. Even when Duke Ren6 appealed in person for help from the
Swiss diet at Luzem on November 23 1476, he failed to persuade the Eidgenossen to join
the campaign to relieve Nancy.

On December 4 Schwyz, Unterwalden and Glarus

complained that it was too cold for campaigning; Bern and Fribourg pretended that they
feared a counter attack from Burgundy; Zurich, Luzern and Solothurn agreed to help, but
only if all the other cantons did so too. Ren6 had to be satisfied with an unofficial army
of Swiss volunteers. It now seems likely that Louis XI was among those who provided
the cash to pay these Swiss mercenaries. However, just as Charles had refused to believe
that the Swiss would attack him at Murten, so at Nancy he refused to believe that the
Swiss would actually give Duke Ren6 assistance. He therefore prolonged his siege of
Nancy into the month of January.
The army advancing to relieve Nancy was an army of allies, of contingents from
enemies of Burgundy. It included Duke Ren6's own army, the mercenaries he had raised

in Bern, Zurich, Luzem, Schwyz, Glarus and Zofingen, as well as the men of the
Sundgau, Colmar, and S6lestat and finally contingents of the armies of Duke Sigmund
of Austria and the bishops of Basel and Strasbourg.

Charles' army of 5000 was

outnumbered four to one. The Burgundian military catastrophe at Nancy resulted from
three factors: Charles' cold, exhausted and demoralized troops were attacked by an army
of fresh volunteers and well paid mercenaries; Charles had made the serious tactical error
of positioning his men near an unreconnoitred forest; Charles had rejected the advice to
withdraw repeatedly proffered by his captains. As the allies moved forward toward
Nancy on Sunday morning, January 5 1477, a heavy snow was falling. About midday
the allied vanguard emerged from a forest near Charles' right flank. After three long
blasts on the Swiss horns, the attack began. The cavalry on Charles' right wing soon
began to give way under the onslaught, nor was there time for the Burgundian artillery
to be trained on the attackers. The rest of the allied army now delivered a frontal assault
on the Burgundian positions across the J arville stream.
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positions were overrun and Charles' infantry was either cut down or thrown back in
confusion. His entire army was transformed into a collection of desperate fugitives,
himself among them. The allies took the wealthier fugitives prisoner for their ransoms
and killed the others who did not drown themselv~ trying to cross the half-frozen
Meurthe. Two days later the body of the forty-four year old Duke of Burgundy was
found. It had been stripped of clothes and jewels and the face was mangled. Apparently
Charles the Bold had fallen from his horse while trying to clear a stream in his flight.
Perhaps already wounded, he had then been despatched with a blow which had cut open
his head. With him expired the Duchy of Burgundy which had been the glory of Europe
for more than a century.
Charles the Bald's downfall was precipitated by the interference of his policies
of centralization with the democratic self-rule of the free towns of the Upper Rhine and
the Swiss Confederation. While Charles' policies had led to a dramatic increase in the
efficiency of the government of Burgundy, the Alsatian and Swiss towns deemed the loss
of their sovereignty and the loss of free international trade too high a price to pay for

such practical improvements.

Charles the Bold's centralized style of government

heralded the absolutism which would dominate the governments of France, Germany,

Russia and Britain in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Ironically, Charles the
Bold and the Valois Dukes of Burgundy also heralded the present movement for regional
autonomy in Europe. In their vigorous efforts to protect the independence of Burgundy
from neighboring artificial kingdoms, such as France, created through the arts of
imperialist war and diplomacy, the Valois Dukes established an important precedent.
They are the historical founders of the current movement to win recognition for the rights
of the various regions of the European Union, a movement which is virulently expressed
in Catalonia, Languedoc, Brittany, Alsace, Flanders, Bavaria, Scotland, Ireland and
Sicily, and which led in 1990 to the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the restoration
within former Soviet territory of autonomous states such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania
and the Ukraine.
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We have traced with candor the causes of the struggle between Burgundy and
Switzerland for hegemony in Geneva, the Valais and the Vaud. However, the story is
not complete. An irascible and vain, yet learned and compassionate Humanist Prince,
Charles the Bold, as well as his Duchy's friendship and conflict with the Swiss
Confederation, will continue to excite the interest of students of European history for
centuries to come.
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NOTES
1

I would like to thank Mme Heidi Schilt, a graduate student in the Department of

German at the University of Lausanne, for her generosity and assistance in the
preparation of this article. Mme Schilt sent me several texts of Swiss history, including
a brand new edition of Nouvelle Histoire de la Suisse, which I frequently consulted. I
would also like to acknowledge the curators of the Bernisches Historisches Museum in
Bern and the Landesmuseum in Zurich, whose meticulously prepared exhibits inspired
my work.
2

The Burgundians first appear in history in Germany in conflict with the Huns during

the fifth century, recounted in Das Nibelungenlied. When the Frankish Merovingian
Kingdom was partitioned in 561 AD, the son of Clotaire I, Guntram, secured the regnum
Burgundiae, including the territory around Lake Geneva, Switzerland west of the Saane,
the valleys of the Sa0ne and the Rh0ne in France, as well as the Val d 'Aosta in northern
Italy. Many of the people of these regions are of Burgundian descent. When the last
independent Burgundian King Rudolf III died without an heir in 1032, he left his
kingdom to the German Emperor Conrad II.

Thereafter the original Kingdom of

Burgundy united with the Kingdom of Provence; this composite kingdom was still known
as the Kingdom of Burgundy until the end of the twelfth century, afterwards as the
Kingdom of Aries. German influence in the kingdom gradually yielded to French. In
1378 the German Emperor Charles IV ceded his rights in this kingdom to the French
King Charles VI. The northeastern region of the kingdom around Lake Geneva had
already been gradually appropriated by the Dukes of Savoy after the death of Rudolf III.
A central thesis of this article is that the imperialism of the German Emperors, the Kings
of France and the Dukes of Savoy had usurped the rightful autonomy of the Kingdom of
Burgundy. Burgundy's autonomy was properly restored by the four Valois Dukes of
Burgundy in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.
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3

Charles the Bold's relationship with the Swiss exemplifies this exasperation which

plagued him throughout his career. He exhausted his talents as a diplomat, sending
numerous embassies to the Swiss, and yet he was unable to prevent the Swiss declaration
of war against himself in October 1474.
4

Diebold Schilling, the official chronicler of the Burgundian Wars, begins his narration

with an account of Bern's alliance with Mulhouse in 1466.
' A large part of the Burgundian treasure captured by the Swiss at Grandson is on display
at the Bernisches Historisches Museum in Bern.

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol32/iss3/1

46

et al.: Full Issue

46

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Armstrong, Charles A. England, France and Burgundy in the Fifteemh Century. London: The
Hambledon Press, 1983.

Barante, Amable G. Histoire des Dues de Bourgog11e. Paris: Le Club Fran~ais du Livre, 1969.
Bittman, Karl. Ludwig XI und Karl der Kuhne. Die Memoiren des Philipp de Commynes als

historische Quelle. Gottingen: Max-Planck Institut fiir Geschichte, 1970.
Boehm, Laetitia. Geschichte Burgu,uls. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1971.
Calmette, Joseph. The Golden Age of Burgundy. Trans. Doreen Weightman. New York: W.W.
Norton, 1963.
Cartellieri, Otto. The Court of Burgundy. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1929.
Casey,

Robert J.

The Lost Kingdom

of Burgundy.

New York:

The Century

Company, 1923.
Commeaux, Charles. Histoire des Bourguignons. Paris: Femand Nathan, 1977.
Commynes, Philippe de. Memoires. Ed. J. Calmette and G. Durville. 3 vols. Paris: Classiques
de l'histoire de France au moyen age, 1924-5.
Gasser, Andre. "Les relations historiques de la Bourgogne et de l' Alsace." Revue bourguigonne.
6(1916-17), 277-95 and 321-36.
Gilliard, Charles. A History of Switzerland. Trans. D.L.B. Hartley. London: George Allen and
Unwin, 1961.
Helbling, Hanno. Histoire Suisse. Trans. Andre Hurst.
Huizinga, Johan.

The Wani11g of the Middle Ages.

Trans. F. Hopman.

London:

Hannondsworth, 1965.
Kirk, John Foster. History of Charles the Bold. 2 vols. London: John Murray, 1863.
Kohn, Hans. Nationalism and Liberty: The Swiss Example. London: George Allen and Unwin,
1956.
Martin, William. Switzerland from Roman Times to the Present. Trans. Jocasta Innes. New
York: Praeger, 1971.
McCracken, W.D. The Rise of the Swiss Republic. 1901. Reprint. New York: AMS Press,
1970.

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive,

47

Swiss American Historical Society Review, Vol. 32 [], No. 3, Art. 1

47
Mockli, Werner. Schweizergeist, Landigeist? Zurich: Schulthess Polygraphischer Verlag, 1973.
Moranf, Nicolas. •vHevre de la Puissance, 1394-1S36. • In Nouvelle histoire de la Suisse.
2d ed., ed. Jean-Claude Favez. Lausanne: Payot, 1986.

Paledilhe, Dominique. Les 1ra Riches H~ura tk BourgogM. Paris: Librairie Academique
Perrin, 1971.
Putnam, Ruth. Charles the Bold: Last Duke of Burgundy. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons,
1908.
Schaufelberger, Walter.

•spitmittelalter. • In Ha11dbuch der Schweizer Geschichte.

Ed. C.

Ulrich. 2 vols. Zurich: Berichthaus, 1980.
Schilling, Diebold. Die Berner-Chro11ik, 1468-84. 2 vols. Bern: Tobler, 1901.
Siegfried, Andre. Switzerland, A Democratic Way of Life. Trans. Edward Fitzgerald. New
York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950.
Thilrer, Georg. Free and Swiss: 1he Story of Switzerland. Trans. E. Long and R.P. Heller.
Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1971.
Tyler, William R. Dijon and the Valois Dukes of Burgundy. Norman: University of Oklahoma
Press, 1971.

Vale, Malcolm. War and Chivalry: England, Fra1J« and Burgundy at the End of the Middle
Ages. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1981.

Vaughan, Richard. Charles the Bold: the Last Valois Duke of Burgu,uly. London: Longman,
1973.

--·

Philip the Bold: the Formation ofthe Burgundian State. Cambridge: Harvard University

Press, 1962.
Philip the Good: the Apogee of Burgundy. London: Longman, 1970.

--·

Valois Burgundy. London: Allen Lane, 1973.

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol32/iss3/1

48

et al.: Full Issue

48
II.

REVIEW

Arnold H. Price, 1he Germanic Warrior Qubs. Universitas Verlag: Tiibingen, 1994.
Pp. 79.

Scholarship concerning the migrations of the Germanic tribes and their
assimilation into the Roman Empire has been divided for centuries into essentially two
schools of thought: the writings of medieval British, French and Italian authors and the
historians of the French Enlightenment, such as Montesquieu and Voltaire, who perceived
the Germanic migrations as destructive and malicious invasions of the Roman world; the
writings of nineteenth and twentieth century German scholar-apologists, who have sought
to justify the Germanic migrations by stressing that these movements were necessitated
by the pressure exerted upon the Germanic tribes by the westward progressing Huns and
by advancing arguments proving that the Germanic tribes preserved much more than they
destroyed upon entry into the Roman Empire. Both points of view are corroborated
by a vast amount of documentation. Eluding rational explanation are the many examples
of wanton destructiveness and vandalism perpetrated by the Germanic invaders.

By

serving to elucidate this mystery, The Germanic Warrior Clubs is a most welcome
addition to the scholarly literature on the subject.
,

Dr. Price's principal contributions are a more precise definition of the institutions
and social function of the warrior clubs, a more exact identification of their geographic
locations, and an integrated account of the dynamic role they played in the Germanic
invasions of Western Europe between the third and the fifth centuries. The Germanic
warrior club is defined by Dr. Price as a predominantly religious organization consisting
of free, unmarried men who had made a commitment to its deity, a joint commitment
manifested in communal living in their own village, in armed expeditions, in the wearing
of distinctive garbs and masks, in the worship of Woden, in the acquisition of a new,
almost magical identity and in the adoption of a new way of life. All free men had to
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join these organizations at the age of twelve.

Membership was terminated upon

inheriting a homestead or entering the state of matrimony.
According to the author's definition, such a warrior club constituted an
autonomous state within a larger tribal state. Its autonomy is exemplified by several
episodes from the saga of the Nibelungen. In the story of the Burgundian Nibelungen,
for example, Hagen is not subordinate to the commands of his king Gunther in a feudal
sense and makes major military decisions on his own; the warrior club nature of Hagen's
followers is demonstrated by their fight-to-the-finish compulsion. Similarly, the Norse
Nibelungen are represented as an independent group garrisoned in their own castle
obeying not the king but their own leader Siegfried. Siegfried's cape is perceived as a
vestige of the distinctive garb worn by members of warrior clubs which imbued them
with supernatural powers. A final aspect of the Nibelungen saga related to the warrior
club tradition is the document's presentation of the Dwarf Alberich as a special leader
with magical powers who lives at some distance from his fellow Nibelungen. These
characteristics are identical with those of a typical warrior club leader. The author
considers the dwarves in the Germanic epos to be mythological versions of certain
warrior club members. Not only does Dr. Price's interpretation of the Nibelungen saga
illuminate the influence of Germanic social practices upon early German literature; it also
clarifies the interpersonal relationships among the saga's characters and thus makes a
significant contribution to literary scholarship.
The book's revelation of the warrior club's autonomy sheds light upon the
hitherto perplexing discrepancy between the Germanic invaders' violence-noted by St.
Jerome, St. Augustine, Sidonius Apollinarius, Ammianus Marcellinus and Edward
Gibbon-and the constructive assimilation of the same Germanic invaders into Roman
civilization, verified by numerous eminent German apologists.

Which reports are

trustworthy? Dr. Price's study enables the researcher to identify more precisely the truth
and the exaggerations in both historical perspectives upon the Germanic invasions. His
elucidation of the mystical Dionysiac frenzy typical of these warrior clubs' behavior
during raids clarifies the terror associated with them by Tacitus and other ancient authors.
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His identification of the Saxons and the Salian Franks as two tribes having especially
active warrior clubs explains the salient roles these two particular tribes played in the
aggression leading to the Germanic settlement of Britain and northeastern France. His
declaration of the absence of warrior clubs among the Jutes and the Ripuarian Franks and
his omission of any references to the Hermanduri and the Marcomanni explains the
passive, even cordial temperaments of the latter tribes.
Dr. Price corroborates the case of the German apologists by presenting the
Saxons in Britain and the Ripuarian Franks in Neustria in two distinct phases of
evolution: during the decades immediately following their invasions these tribes
maintained their warrior status and built defensive castles; with the passage of time,
however, these warriors were tamed by the feudal system, became law abiding subjects
of the local lord and contributed to the establishment of the medieval Germanic kingdoms
and the advancement of the region's civilization. The author stresses that the process of
transition from the tribal to the feudal phase of Germanic history is poorly understood
and requires further investigation.
Especially useful is this book's association of the warrior clubs with exact
geographical locations. Dr. Price claims that villages and cities whose names and in
"ham" or "heim" were originally settled by and owe their existence to the migrations of
the warrior clubs. An examination of the map of Europe verifies his claim. In central
and south central England, regions settled by the Saxons, the observer does indeed note
a proliferation of place names ending in "ham", and an observation of the Rhine valley,
the area of the incursions of the Salian Franks, reveals a similar proliferation of place
names ending in "heim". Further corroborating the identification of these places as sites
of warrior club settlement is the discovery in their neighborhoods of row-grave
cemeteries and elevated sections of land intended for cul tic observances, typical attributes
of the warrior club village.
For readers interested in Swiss issues, it should be noted that the book uses as
an illustration of Hamsocn/Heimsuche the early modern Swiss practice whereby an
organized group of young men, often disguised as animals, descended with fury upon an
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unpopular fellow citizen in his home, consuming his food and drink and breaking his
furniture. Unfortunately, the author does not include the Alemanni among the Germanic
tribes he chooses to analyze.

Of especially high interest is the question whether the

exceptionally violent invasion of Switzerland by the Alemanni in the third century can
be attributed to warrior club practices and mentalities among Alemannic warriors. This
subject merits exploration.
While historically verifiable, the book's conclusion is most disturbing. Although
the warrior clubs were tamed by the twin processes of feudalism and Christianity, the
communities which they founded preserve even today trademarks of their military
origins.

Over the centuries this ancestral bellicose ghost has resurrected itself and

manifested itself in expressions of military might and fury and occasional Dionysiac
madness. Thus Dr. Price considers twentieth century German militarism to be a remnant
of a no longer overtly accepted pagan value system.

The Germanic endowment of

military commanders with a special wisdom similar to the power of divination attributed
to warrior club leaders, the Germanic perception of the armed forces as fulfilling a noble,
almost religious task and the Germanic anticipation of military disaster expressed by the
Siegfried Line of World War I, Operation Barberossa and the Ludendorf Bridge of World
War II are all evidence of the perpetuation of the ancient Germanic warrior club
mentality. The proven capacity of such a mentality to wreak havoc in Europe is the
source of the justified alarm of all of Germany's neighbors.

Students in Germanic

countries should study the history of their tribal and military past and should recognize
the role of the ancient warrior clubs in the formation of modern Europe.

Yet The

Germanic Warrior Clubs tacitly announces the far stronger ethical imperative exhorting
these same students to study more seriously the history of their region's theology and
philosophy and to learn to apply the dictates of reason and compassion expressed therein
in their own treatment of people of all races, as their Swiss brethren have been doing in
the fields of international diplomacy and domestic humanitarianism for the past five
hundred years.

H. Dwight Page
The University of Memphis
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